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STATEMENT OF ISSUES
A.

Under the test established in Hutchinson v.

Hutchinson, 649 P.2d 38 (Utah 1982) , may a finding that a natural
parent lacks two of the three characteristics giving rise to the
presumption in favor of awarding custody to a parent over a nonparent support the conclusion that the presumption has been
rebutted.
B.

Does the evidence support the trial courtfs findings

that the defendant Richard B. Kishpaugh:
1.

Lacks the sympathy for and understanding of the

child that is characteristic of parents generally; and
2.

Has failed to sacrifice his own interest and welfare

for the child's interest and welfare.
C.

Did the trial court err in failing to instruct

Kishpaugh what he should do in the future to obtain custody of
Brian.
D.

If the parental presumption has been rebutted, is it

in the childfs best interest that the petitioners William and
Kathryn Kornmayer be awarded custody.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A.

Nature of the Case.

This is an appeal by the defen-

dant Richard B. Kishpaugh from an order awarding custody of the
minor child, Brian, to his maternal grandparents, William and
Kathryn Kornmayer.

B.

Course of the Proceedings,

The plaintiff Karla Kishpaugh (Plaintiff) was awarded
custody of Brianf born February 18, 1976, under the decree of
divorce entered June 25, 1981.

The defendant Richard Kishpaugh

(Kishpaugh) petitioned the court on April 27, 1984 to modify the
decree so that he might obtain custody of Brian.

The petitioners

William and Kathryn Kornmayer (Petitioners) also filed a petition
for custody, after it was determined Plaintiff would be unable to
care for Brian due to illness.

The hearing on both petitions

came on before the Honorable Dean E. Conder of the Third Judicial
District Court on November 22, 1984.
C.

Disposition in the District Court.

On December 7, 1984, the District Court entered an order
awarding custody to Petitioners, after finding that the presumption in favor of awarding custody to a parent over a nonparent
had been rebutted, and that it was in Brian's best interest that
Petitioners be awarded custody .
D.

Statement of Material Facts.

Brian was born February 18, 1976 and is the sole issue
of the marriage of Kishpaugh and Plaintiff (F.F. 1). Although
awarded custody by stipulation in the original decree of divorce
in June, 1981, the Plaintiff has never assumed a custodial role
(T 7,8). Since the decree of divorce, Brian has lived with his
maternal great grandmother, Ona Landrum, and with the

v
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(T 99).

Kishpaugh has further sacrificed his own interests for

Brian's welfare by terminating a close personal relationship with
his girlfriend after she had expressed doubts about the desirability of gaining custody of Brian (T 98).
During the three and one-half years following the
divorcef Kishpaugh paid.nearly $10,000.00 to the Plaintiff:
$6,430.00 of which was support for Brian (F.F. 15). Plaintiff
never forwarded this money to Brian, but rather used it for her
own needs (T 20, 107). After discovering that the payments were
not being forwarded to Brian, Kishpaugh stopped making payments
to Plaintiff (T 106, 107; F.F. 4). Kishpaugh attempted to continue payments by sending the amount, previously agreed upon for
child support between Kishpaugh and Plaintiff (T 104), to Brian's
maternal great-grandmother with whom Brian was living.

She

refused the payments because they were not the amount stated in
the stipulated decree of divorce (T 71, 106, 107).
Due to health problems, Plaintiff will be unable to
assume any custodial role (F.F. 16). At the time of the original
decree of divorce Plaintiff had told Kishpaugh that Brian would
be living with Petitioners for only a short time while Plaintiff
finished her education (T 83). After relying upon Plaintiff's
promises for some time and after discovering that Plaintiff could
not assume custody, Kishpaugh sought custody, believing that
Brian should be raised by his natural parent (T 83-85).
After a hearing on both Kishpaugh's and Petitioners'
petitions for custody, the Honorable Dean E. Conder of the Third

J i i • ::1 :!i :: :i a 1 D :i s i :: i: I c t C o u i: t: a w a i: <:l e d c i i s t o d; ? :) f El i: :i a n t o P e 111 loners
and not to Kishpaugh f the natural father.

The court found the

presumption favoring the natural parent had been rebutted and
that awarding custod5 t ::> I: e t:i t:i ::)i: 1 ers A/.JI . 111 I I ie bes t inter osts of
Brian.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
A

Hutchinson v. Hutchinson, 649 P. 2d 38 (Utah 1982)
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The trial court's conclusion that the parental presump-

tion had been rebutted was, therefore, erroneous.
C.

The trial court erred in failing to provide

Kishpaugh with a standard of improvement whereby he might regain
custody of his son.

Even an individual whose parental rights the

State wishes to terminate is given such a standard and a sixmonth probationary period before any permanent determination is
made.

The trial courtfs failure so to do made useless any future

action by Kishpaugh to reacquire custody, since he has done all
that the law previously required him to do, and he can do no
better than he has done without instruction.

His rights to

custody and Brian's right to be raised by his parent have been
rendered illusory by the trial court's error.
D.

The trial court erred in finding that Brianfs best

interests were served by awarding custody to the Petitioners
William and Kathryn Kornmayer.

Hutchinson set forth the criteria

found important by courts in determining the best interests of a
child in custody disputes.

The trial court's conclusion was not

based upon any of the Hutchinson criteria.

ix

This was error.

ARGUMENT
THE PARENTAL PRESUMPTION MAY BE REBUTTED ONLY UPON A
FINDING THAT A NATURAL PARENT LACKS ALL THREE OF THE
CHARACTERISTICS GIVING RISE TO THE PARENTAL PRESUMPTION.
• '• i "

In Hutchinson v. Hutchinson, 649 P.2< I 38 (Utah 1 982),
irt stated in a unanimous decision:
In a controversy over custody, the paramount consideration is the best interest of the child, but where
one party to the controversy is a nonparent, there is a
presumption in favor of the natural parent.
Citation
deleted]
Hutchinson, '- -volved

Id,, -J* 40.
-• n-

-

jidtaui mother

* - i;

astody dispute between the
^

dent, -; ie mat. *h~ m sb^ ma^ .. vj ^i ^ t „ ",«.
whom she later

**/orced.

*, arvi th^ r^? P nn?.

' * <* evidence showed she was a heavy
1

wise neglected the ?n i • :i -

"

u* l~ r ?hil'i »-^ * '*- f- -• - • parent

'i p r —

:i strict C O J L L denied custody
thp qrounds that*

w.^ in

the best interest ol the ch.i Ld in • i w < .i i • i I,*UM Luily l„u I he mji\[ ;,i IL •=; 111.
Id.
The Hutchinson court held the trial court erred i n nc t

natural parenr

JC ::-_*j, : - u u i u u before making i n q u , ^ ir>tr> the

best interests of the child,

I d • at 4 0 42.

"The Hutchinson court

reasoned tl lat
The parental presumption is not conclusive, State in re
R
L
, 17 Utah 2d 349, 411 P. 2d 839
(1966), but it cannot be rebutted merely by demonstrating that the oppossing party possesses superior qualifications, has established a^ deeper bond with the child,
or is able to provide more desirable circumstances. If
the presumption could be rebutted merely be evidence

i

that a nonparent would be a superior custodian, the
parent's natural right to custody could be rendered
illusory and with it the child's natural right to be
reared, where possible, by his or her natural parent.
Consistent with its rationale, the parental presumption
can be rebutted only by evidence establishing that a^
particular parent at a^ particular time generally lacks
all three of the characteristics that give rise to the
presumption; that no strong mutual bond exists, that
the parent has not demonstrated a willingness to sacrifice his or her own intereast and welfare for the
child's, and that the parent lacks the sympathy for and
understanding of the child that is characteristic of
parents generally. The presumption does not apply to a
parent who would be subject to the termination of all
parental rights due to unfitness, abandonment, or
substantial neglect, since such a parent is a_ fortiori
not entitled to custody. [emphasis added]
Id. at 41.
In the instant case the District Court found the parental presumption had been successfully rebutted based on a finding
that Kishpaugh (1) had failed to sacrifice his own interest and
welfare for Brian (F.F. 11 17); and (2) lacked the sympathy for
and understanding of Brian that are characteristic of parents
generally (F.F. 1[ 18). The District Court did not find that no
strong mutual bond exists.

Indeed, it found Kishpaugh and Brian

have a good relationship (F.F. 11 11 3, 14) and that there is a
deep love between Kishpaugh and Brian (F.F. 1[ 11; T 133,
138-139) .
Hutchinson did not state that the presumption can be
rebutted by showing that two of the three characteristics are
missing in a particular parent at a particular time.

It stated:

. . . the parental presumption can be rebutted only by

2

evidence establishing that a particular parent at a particular time generally lacks all three characteristics
that give rise to the presumption
....
Id. at II.

Hutcni.<.
establishing whether

•
l

•

2*

:,*- p a i e n u . presumption :ta*

and its language is cl ear,

w

• •• tor
; ^er- rebutted,

A 1 ] three characteristics" must be

1 a c k i r 1 g , Wl: I e i: I :i i I t e r p r e t :i i I g <= s t: <= 11 11 = :::: i: c a s e :::: o i 11 a :i i l :i i l g 11: i e
"all™ , the rule i sf generally,, that the plain meaning of tt : .e word
will apply

Thus , "the word

f

al 1' usual ] y does not adin.lt of an

exception, add11 i on or e xc1u sIon. *I
421.

7 3 Am J u r 2 d, St a t ut e s § 2 44 a t

»Aii« i n such a context means "each" or "every".
The District Court, therefore, erred

; •j*--**i:n<:

istody

a t e r i: I a II g r ai id p a r e i I t s , t h e
Hutchinson,
,
11: Ie dIstrIct court addressed the question of the
best interests of the child without first determining
[that] the presumption in favor of the natural parent
had been rebutted,

lUtchinson, Cooper v_,_ DeLand,
652 P.2d ^r

. -:*

vii3 t;o ;' reiterated the three-pronged

Hutchinson test for overcoming the presumption In favor of a
natural parent over a non-pu t"LMI 1 .

C:i ti i: I g Hutchinson, the

stated:
A party seeking tn deprive a natural parent of

•

custody of a minor child can rebut the parental presumption only by evidence establishing that: "no strong
mutual bond exists, that the parent has not demonstrated
a willingness to sacrifice his or her own interest and
welfare for the child's/ and that the parent lacks the
sympathy for and understanding of the child that is
characteristic generally." Only after the parental presumption has been rebutted, will the parties compete on
equal footing, and custody shall then be granted to the
party who will most adequately protect and promote the
best interests of the child.
Cooper, supray at 908-909.
In Cooper, the noncustodial parent petitioned the court
to obtain custody of an eight-year old child from the stepfather
after the death of the custodial parent.

The Honorable Dean E.

Conder of the Third District held for the stepfather, finding
that the natural father had not shown "by clear and convincing
evidence" that it was in the child's best interests to wrest
custody from the stepfather, with whom the child had lived for
five years prior to the petition.

Ic[., at 908.

On appealf the Supreme Court held the district court had
erred in not first determining whether the parental presumption
had been rebutted before enquiring whether the child's best
interests were served by awarding custody to either party.

Id.,

at 908-909.
The trial court has here once again awarded custody to
the nonparent without first establishing the parental presumption
had been rebutted.
for 3 1/2 years.

Brian lived with Mrs. Landrum and Petitioners
In Cooper the child had lived with his step-

father for five years.

The Hutchinson and Cooper standard is not

"who has lived with the child longer," h'it rather, that the child
should g<

*•<'•:" parent unless tv

:*

rebutted

. ..

-

presumption ha^ been

,< -i : ! , i* .- =; - *v-

attributes generally typical of parents.
In Hutchinson, there was evidence to support a finding
I Li'Iiutt.-i]

1 I In

| 1! Mint i I p i M i U J i n p l i ' i n

,„

llK

S n \ n eiiK* C m i t t

ordered the case remanded so the trial court could make that
finding.

In the instant case, there Is no evidence tending to

show Kishpaugh was unf 11,,of parents.

:>i: 11: 1 at 1 ie I acked the qua] 111es typica 1

The trial court plainly erred m

failing to follow

*" 'ie Hutch irmoii M n'uL'inl.
THE RECORD IS DET 1 OIE OP EVIDENCE SI IPPC IF .TING THE

B.

TRIAL COURT'S FINDINGS THAT KISHPAUGH HAS FAILED TO SACRIFICE HIS
OWN INTERESTS AND WELFARE FOR B R I A N f S AND THAT KISHPAUGH LACKS

TYPICAL OF PARENTS.
I,

Kishpaugh has sacrificed his own interests and

welfare for Brian'"' s interests and welfare.

r

has failed tr sacrifice
Brian's.

(F.i. \ ^~,, .

..

*.

. , <i

interests di.ti welfare : H

xi^u Ixiiuiug x^ act Lasea upon the evi™

sie •
According to the testimony heard by the District Court,
Kishpaugh visited Brian r* -'Ui •-«-., Califc-inn, driving the

approximately 360 miles round trip from Renof Nevada, ten to
twelve times from 1981 - 1984.

(T 86). While in Chico,

Kishpaugh often visited Brianfs school.

(T 76).

In addition to Kishpaugh's visits to Chico to see Brian,
Kishpaugh would drive to Chico, pick Brian up, and take him to
Reno every Easter, Thanksgiving, and for a few weeks every
summer.

(T 77).

In 1983 and 1984 Brian was in Reno 3 1/2 and 3

weeks, respectively (T 88 - 89). Kishpaugh also writes Brian
often:

5-6

times in 1983 and 10 times in 1984 (T 94).

During the visits in Reno, Kishpaugh takes Brian camping
and fishing, they go bike riding together, and often go to the
park for picnics or just play (T 89). Although he does not want
to buy his sonfs love, Kishpaugh often gives Brian gifts,
including gifts on every birthday and every Christmas (T 94 - 95),
including two bicycles:

one for use in Reno and one for Chico (T

96 - 97).
Kishpaugh moved to Reno from Salt Lake City in 1981,
giving up a job he had held with the University of Utah police
for four years (T 82) so he could be close to Brian in Chico and
so he could be near his family and have their help in Brian's
care during visitation (T 102).
Kishpaugh has learned sign language so he could better
communicate with Brian (T 87), and has located a church and
school in Reno which provide services for the hearing impaired.
(T 89 - 91).

6

After Kishpaugh learned that Brian would li kely remain
in Chico, rather than i n Salt Lake City with Plaintiff, he
e x p 11 n?"pfi t' In ' i »o . 1111 I in I
Brian.

Plaintiff, threatened that if Kishpaugh took any action in

that regard, she would take nr •• *n ^ersel f , ou f him
l...iVf '* " Sy s I I I H I . I d b
c a r e he n e e d e d ,
Prior
";»ii

4 III ! II :i

"iii

^ daycare ->r

..

-

ne

(T 8 3 - 8 4 )
to January,

• :!: :ii 3 • :1

1 9 8 4 , Kishpaugh p a i d P l a l n t i f f
: I:

(I

I

II

• •f

; ft J •! ,

ia\ J f

w a r d e d t o P e t i t i o n e r s o r 0 n a L a n d r u ni for B r i a i I • s c a r e (F. F

If

M.

Finally, Kishpaugh recently ended a deep personal relationship with hi s girlfriend because she was not i n favor of his
obtaining custody of Brian, demonstrate ^ t.u.. his love : or Brian
was greater than his ] o v e :••:

, :• j l r l f i , en,;

(T 9 8 )

A review of the foregoing testimony elucidates
K:i st lpaugh' s ; i ] 3 iiijnr »' l a

i< i if ice I H I H I I a HI

III I i M j n t m l ,

1 ong trips to Chico, his wi 1 3 ingness to end a re1ationship with
his girlfriend rather than jeopardize hi s relationship wi th his
son, his learning to communi cate through sign language and arrange
for Brian's scholastic and religious instruction, his payment ")f
support,, and ;

.-:*-.,

-

> *

show a very rej. M i ^ n g n e s s t* ^acrific- . t.-.
welfare for Brian's.

: •

,1

*. . ;ietebtc and

The District Court f s finding to the

c o n 11: a i: y i s p 3 a i i i e r r o r .

.

2.

Kishpaugh possesses the sympathy for and understan-

ding of Brian that are characteristic of parents generally.
The record is devoid of evidence supporting the District
Courtfs finding that Kishpaugh lacks the sympathy for and
understanding of Brian that are generally characteristic of
parents (F.F. H 18).
It is uncontroverted that Brian and Kishpaugh enjoy one
anotherfs company (T 77-78), that Kishpaugh has made provision
for Brian's care and instruction in Reno (T 87, 89-91), and that
Kishpaugh is willing to terminate a relationship with his
girlfriend because of her reluctance to support his love for
Brian (T 98).

These are not the attributes or acts of a man

lacking a parent's sympathy and understanding.

The District

Court plainly erred in finding Kishpaugh was so lacking:

his

sympathy and understanding are as strong as any parent's,
C.

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO PROVIDE

KISHPAUGH WITH A STANDARD OF IMPROVEMENT BY WHICH HE MIGHT LATER
OBTAIN CUSTODY OF BRIAN.
The trial court did not give Kishpaugh any instructions
for improving himself so that he might later overcome whatever
deficiencies he might have and reacquire custody of Brian.
was error.

This

The only direction the court gave was to "double your

efforts and your love for this little boy."

(T 140).

Even a person whose parenthood the State wishes to terminate is given some direction.

In an involuntary termination

proceeding under § 78-3A-48, Utah Code Annotated (19 53 as
amended) and its predecessor, § 55-1-109, Utah Code Annotated
(1953 as amended), the parent is given specific improvement criteria and a six-month probationary period.

Thus, if the parent

makes the necessary changes in his or her life, the child will be
returned and the involuntary termination proceeding dropped.
In the instant case, Kishpaugh has worked diligently to
provide an economically and emotionally stable environment for
himself and Brian.

He has maintained a good relationship with

his son despite the distance between Chico and Reno.

He has even

made provision for Brian's special needs by locating schooling
and church services for the hearing impaired in Reno.

In short,

Kishpaugh has demonstrated his willingness to do everything
necessary to provide for Brian's physical, spiritual, and emotional needs.
It is fundamentally unfair to deny Kishpaugh custody and
then to give him no standard for improvement.

It appears the

trial court made its decision based largely on the fact that
Brian had lived with Ona Landrum and the Petitioners for 3 1/2
years.
control:

(T 13 5).

This circumstance was not under Kishpaugh1s

Plaintiff had legal custody, but chose to have Brian

raised elsewhere.
It is plain error to base a determination of onefs
worthiness as a parent on a circumstance like the length of time
the child lived with someone else.

Worse still, this cir-

cumstance remains outside Kishpaugh's control.

It would seem the

longer Brian lives with Petitioners, the less likely it is that
Kishpaugh will ever reacquire custody.
Even assuming arguendo that the parental presumption has
been rebutted and Brian's best interests dictate Petitioners
should have custody, the trial court still failed to follow the
Hutchinson standard in failing to give Kishpaugh a standard of
improvement.

Much as a failure to find rebuttal of the parental

presumption, the failure to instruct has effectively precluded
Kishpaugh ever from obtaining custody, thereby rendering illusory
"the parent's right to custody . . .

[and] the child's natural

right to be reared, when possible, by his or her natural parent."
Hutchinson, supra, 649. P.2d at 41.
D.

IT IS IN BRIAN'S BEST INTERESTS THAT KISHPAUGH BE

AWARDED CUSTODY.
The Hutchinson case stated that once the parental presumption is rebutted, the parties will compete on equal footing,
and custody awarded solely in the best interests of the child.
Hutchinson 649 P.2d at 41. Although the Hutchinson Court stated
an appellate court should interpose its own judgment for that of
the trial court only when the trial court's decision is
flagrantly unjust, the following factors were considered determinative of the child's best interests:
Some factors the court may consider in determining the child's best interests relate primarily to

i n

the child's feelings or special needs: the preference
of the child; keeping siblings together; the relative
strength of the childfs bond with one or both of the
prospective custodians; and, in appropriate cases, the
general interst in continuing previously determined
custody arrangements where the child is happy and well
adjusted. Other factors relate primarily to the
prospective custodians1 character or status or to their
capacity or willingness to function as parents: moral
characater and emotional stability: duration anddepth
of desire for custody; ability to provide personal
rather than surrogate care; significant impairment of
ability to function as a parent through drug abuse,
excessive drinking, or other cause, reasons for having
relinquished custody in the past; religious compatability with the child; kinship, including, in
extraordinary circumstances, stepparent status; and
financinal condition. (These factors are not
necessarily listed in order of importance) [Citations
deleted]
Id.

These factors will be considered in the order presented

above.
1.

Preference of the child.

Brian indicated he would

prefer to live with Petitioners and Ona Landrum, with whom he
has lived the past 3 1/2 years (F.F. 1[ 9)
2.

Siblings.

Brian is an only cild, but has young

cousins who live in Reno with whom he has established a good
relationship.
3.

(T 116).
Bond.

The Court found there is a strong bond bet-

ween Brian and all the parties.
4.

(T 133, 138-139)

Continuing Previous Custody.

Plaintiff has had

custody, but took no role in Brian's rearing or support:

sending

Brian to Chico to stay with her parents and grandmother while she
remained in Salt Lake City.

Plaintiff ultimately gave up her

custodial rights, allowing Kishpaugh to assume custody by
default.

(F.F. 1 11 2, 4, 5, 8, 16).
5.

Kishpaugh's moral character and emotional stability.

These were never at issue in this matter.
6.
custody.

Duration and depth of Kishpaugh1s desire for

Kishpaugh wanted custody from the beginning when Brian

first went to live in Chico.

Plaintiff's threats intimidated

him, however, and he took no formal steps until he learned of
Plaintiff's ill health.
7.

(T 83-84)

Ability to provide personal care.

able to care for Brian every day:

Kishpaugh will be

he works a regular shift (7:30

- 3:30), and would have his parents' aid in the early morning and
afternoon, immediately before and after school (T 92, 115).
Petitioners have had Brian only on the weekends.

Ona Landrum has

cared for Brian during the week (T 28).
8.

Impairment through drugs, alcohol.

None of the par-

ties drinks heavily or uses drugs, although Petitioner William
Kornmayer does use alcohol
9.

(T 57).

Kishpaugh's reasons for relinquishing custody.

Plaintiff, Brian's mother, was awarded custody by agreement.
that time, Kishpaugh felt Brian should be with his mother.

At

When

it became clear plaintiff would not care for Brian, Kishpaugh
first explored the possibility of obtaining custody.

(T 83-84).

10.

Religious compatability.

When Brian was born, both

Kishpaugh and Plaintiff were members of the LDS faith (Mormon).
Petitioners are Episcopalian.

Further, Kishpaugh has expressed

the desire to raise Brian in the LDS faith:

Petitioners have

expressed no opinion as to Brian's religious instruction.

(T 56,

57).
11.

Kinship.

Kishpaugh is Brian's natural father,

whereas Petitioners and Ona Landrum are his grandparents and
great-grandmother, respectively.
12.

Financial Condition.

The financial condition of

the parties was never at issue in this matter.
The only factor clearly not in Kishpaughfs favor is
Brianfs wish to remain where he has been the last 3 1/2 years.
For all the remaining factors, there is no real difference between the parties, as with "impairment through drugs or alcohol"
or the matter is clearly in Kishpaughfs favor, as with "kinship".
The District Court plainly erred in finding it in
Brian1s best interests that Petitioners be awarded custody.

The

custody evaluation done in both Kishpaughfs and the Petitioners1
homes showed that Brian would do equally well in either environment.

(T 5-7). The most superficial of anlayses of the relevant

factors set forth in Hutchinson, supra, however, shows it would
be in Brian's best interest that Brian be raised by his father
and not by the Petitioners.
sion was error.

The trial court's contrary conclu-

CONCLUSION
The trial court erred in concluding the parental presumption had been rebutted upon a finding that Kishpaugh lacks
two of the three attributes generally characteristic of parents.
The standard set out in Hutchinson v. Hutchinson/ 649 P.2d 38
(Utah 1983) requires that all three characteristics be lacking
before the presumption favoring a parent over a nonparent could
be rebutted.
In addition/ the trial court erred in finding Kishpaugh
lacked two of the three attributes generally characteristic of
parents.

Such findings were not based upon the evidence.

The

trial court also erred in failing to apply the standard set out
in Hutchinson for determining whether it was in Brian1s best
interest that Kishpaugh be awarded custody.

An analysis of the

Hutchinson factors make clear it is in Brianfs best interests
that Kishpaugh reassume Brian's care.
Finally/ the trial court erred in failing to provide
Kishpaugh with a standard of conduct/ which/ by following/
Kishpaugh could obtain custody of his son.

The trial courtfs

failure so to do has rendered Kishpaughfs natural right to
custody and Brian1s right to be raised by his natural parent

illusory.
Respectully submitted this JT day of

Ct^t/^V

>

1985.
LARSEN, MAZURAN & VERHAAREN P.C,
Attorneys for Appellant
B y 3<^7\C> w0fc4 ^<^<r • ^OtVi-u^-v^
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until a contributor fails to pay. The Commission members' salaries are not affected
by their judicial decisions and they have no
pecuniary reason to penalize delinquent
contributors. Although, pursuant to § 354-15, the Commission is responsible for the
administration of the Special Administrative Expense Fund where all interest and
penalties are deposited, this interest is.too
remote to establish any reasonable likelihood of bias.
Affirmed. No costs.
HALL, C. J., and OAKS, HOWE and
DURHAM, JJ., concur.

1. Divorce c=» 298(1)
Standard governing actions for involuntary and permanent termination of all
parental rights to child, which requires
showing of parental unfitness, abandonment or substantial neglect, is not applicable to disputes between parent and nonparent over custody after parent and nonparent divorce. U.C.A.1953, 78-3a-48(a).
2. Parent and Child o=>2(10)
Parent may be deprived of custody on
less compelling showing than is required for
termination of all parental rights. U.C.A.
1953. 7S-3a-a 10), 78-3a-48(a).
3. Divorce s=» 298(1)

When controversy over custody arises
in divorce proceeding, paramount consideration is best interest of child, but where one
party to controversy is nonparent, there is
presumption in favor of natural parent
U.C.A.1953, 78-3a-2(10), 73-3a-48(a).

Rosemary HUTCHISON, Plaintiff
and Appellant,
v.
Dale Hany HUTCHISON, Defendant
and Respondent.
No- 17439.
Supreme Court of Utah.
June 14, 1982.

In a dispute between former spouses
over the custody of a child born to the wife
before the marriage, the Fourth District
Court, Utah County, George £ Ballif, J.,
awarded custody to the former husband of
a child born to the wife before the parties'
marriage. Former wife appealed. The Supreme Court, Oaks, J., held that the district
court improperly awarded custody to the
former husband without a determination of
whether the former wife was entitled to the
parental presumption.
Vacated and remanded.

4. Parent and Child s=»2(2, 8)
It is rooted in common experience of
mankind, which teaches that parent and
child normally share strong attachment or
bond for each other, that natural parent
will normally sacrifice personal interest and
welfare for child's benefit, and that natural
parent is normally more sympathetic and
understanding and better able to win confidence and love of child than anyone else;
therefore, in custody disputes between parent and nonparent, presumption arises in
favor of natural parent
5. Parent and Child <*»2(8)
In custody disputes between parent and
nonparent, presumption in favor of natural
parent is not conclusive, but it cannot be
rebutted merely by demonstrating that opposing party possesses superior qualifications, has established deeper bond with
child or is able to provide more desirable
circumstances.
& Parent and Child ^ 2 ( 8 )
In custody disputes between parent and
nonparent, if presumption in favor of natural parent could be rebutted merely by evidence that nonparent would be superior
cu*t<»lian. parent's natural right to custody

would be rendere<
child's natural ngl
possible, by his or I
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would be rendered illusory and with it
child's natural right to be reared, where
possible, by his or her natural parent
7. Parent and Child <*=»2(8)
In custody disputes between parent and
nonparent parental presumption can be rebutted only by evidence establishing that
particular parent at particular time generally lacks all three characteristics that give
rise to presumption: that no strong mutual
bond exists, that parent has not demonstrated willingness to sacrifice his or her
own interest and welfare for child's and
that parent lacks sympathy for and understanding of child that is characteristic of
parents generally.
& Parent and Child <*»2(8)
In custody dispute between parent and
nonparent, presumption in favor of natural
parent does not apply to parent who would
be subject to termination of all parental
rights due to unfitness, abandonment or
substantial neglect, since such parent is a
fortiori not entitled to custody.
9. Parent and Child <*=»2(3.1)
In custody disputes between parent and
nonparent, if presumption in favor of natural parent is rebutted, contestants for custody compete on equal footing, and custody
award should be determined solely by reference to best interests of child.
10. Parent and Child *=> 2(3.1, 3JJ, 1 4 , 1 6 )
In custody dispute between parent and
nonparent, after presumption in favor of
natural parent has been rebutted, some factors court may consider in determining
child's best interests related primarily to
child's feelings or special needs: preference
of child; keeping siblings together, relative
strength of child's bond with one or more of
prospective custodians; and, in appropriate
c^ses, general interest in continuing previously determined custody arrangements
where child is happy and well adjusted;
other factors to be considered relate primarily to prospective custodians' character
or status or ability or willingness to function as parents.

11, Parent and Child c»2(lS)
In custody dispute between parent and
nonparent, assessments of applicability and
relative weight of various factors in particular case lie within discretion of trial court
12. Parent and Child o=»2(14)
In custody dispute between parent and
nonparent, trial court must enter specific
findings on factors relied upon in awarding
custody.
11 Divorce <3»30l
In dispute between former spouses over
custody of child born to wife before marriage, district court improperly awarded
custody of child born to wife before marriage to former husband without first determining whether former wife was entitled to benefit of parental presumption.
Richard B. Johnson, Provo, for plaintiff
and appellant
Wayne B. Watson, Orem, for defendant
and respondent
OAKS, Justice:
This controversy between former spouses
over the custody of a child bom to the wife
before their marriage requires us to clarify
the legal standard governing a child-custody dispute between a parent and a nonparent
Appellant, Rosemary, gave birth to Lacey
Hutchison in February, 1975. In September, 1975, Rosemary married respondent
Dale Hutchison. Two more children were
bom during the course of their marriage:
In February, 1980, the parties were divorced Trial evidence showed that Dale had
damaged property, struck Rosemary, and
harshly disciplined the children. Other evidence showed that Rosemary was a heavy
drinker, had left home for days at a time
without explanation, and had neglected the
children. Dale was granted temporary custody of all three children, but the resolution
of permanent custody was deferred pending
a blood test on Lacey's paternity and home
evaluations by the Department of Family
Services (DFS). The blood test excluded
Dale as Lacey's father.
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Thereafter, on November 12, 1980, the
district court granted Dale permanent custody of all three children, subject to reasonable visitation rights in Rosemary. The
order was not accompanied by formal findings of fact and conclusions of law. In a
memorandum decision, the district court
stated that Dale's name appears on Lacey's
birth certificate; that he has "in every
way" treated the child as his own; and
that, although the blood test excluded him
as Lacey's natural father, she considers him
her father both psychologically and biologically.1 Based on trial testimony and on
reports of a psychiatrist and a DFS social
worker, the court determined "that the best
interests of the minor children would be
served by their placement with the defendant [Dale] and that all three children should
remain together for their mutual benefit
and well-being/* The memorandum decision further stated:
[I]n weighing the interests of the minor
children in this situation the welfare of
the three is paramount over any superior
right the plaintiff [Rosemary] may have
to the custody of the child where it is
determined that the defendant [Dale] is
the better custodial parent for his two
natural children by the plaintiff, as well
as the child in question [Lacey].
Rosemary challenges only that portion of
the order granting Lacey's custody to Dale.
Specifically, she contends that the mother
of an illegitimate child cannot be deprived
of custody of her child absent a showing of
unfitness or abandonment
[1] We cannot agree with either the district court's or Rosemary's characterization
of the standard governing custody disputes
between a parent and a nonparent The
court's standard was solely the best interests of the child. The standard Rosemary
advocates is, in effect, the standard governI. However, Dale states in his brief that he
"does not here seek custody i s one who has
allegedly adopted the child by acknowledgement" but rather "as a third party with whom
che child should be placed m the best interest
of the child."

ing actions for involuntary and permanent
termination of all parental rights to a child,
which requires a showing of parental unfitness, abandonment, or substantial neglect
U.C.A., 1953, § 78-3a-48(a) (1965); In re J.
R.S48P 2d 1364 (Utah 1982).
[2] Loss of custody is less drastic than
the permanent termination of parental
rights. The custody determination is not
permanent, since it expires automatically
when the child comes of age, and it is
reversible prior to that time. Most importantly, loss of custody does not deprive the
noncustodial parent of all rights in relation
to the child. See U.C.A., 1953, § 78-3a2(10); In re J. P., supra, n. 1. For these
reasons, a parent may be deprived of custody on a less compelling showing than is
required for termination of all parental
rights.
[3,4] In a controversy over custody, the
paramount consideration is the best interest
of the child, but where one party to the
controversy is a nonparent, there is a presumption in favor of the natural parent
Walton v. Coffman, 110 Utah i, 1© P.2d 97
(1946).2 This presumption recognizes "the
natural right and authority of the parent to
the child's custody
'* State in re Jennings, 20 Utah 2d 50, 52, 432 R2d 379, 380
(1967). It is rooted in the common experience of mankind, which teaches that parent
and child normally share a strong attachment or bond for each other, that a natural
parent will normally sacrifice personal interest and welfare for the child's benefit,
and that a natural parent is normally more
sympathetic and understanding and better
able to win the confidence and love of the
child than anyone else. Walton v. Coffman,
110 Utah at 13, 169 P.2d at 103.
X This statement of the standard is typical of
many American jurisdictions. For a survey of
jurisdictions, see Comment. "Psychological
Parents vs. Biological Parents: The Courts' Re*
sponse to New Directions in Child Custody
Dispute Resolution," 17 J. of Fam.L 545, 55274 (1979). See *lso Annoc., 31 A.LR.3d U87
(1970).
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[5,6] The parental presumption is not
conclusive, State in re R
f.
17
Utah 2d 349, 411 P.2d 839 (1966), but it
cannot be rebutted merely by demonstrating that the opposing party possesses superior qualifications, has established a deeper
bond with the child, or is able to provide
more desirable circumstances. If the pre*
sumption could be rebutted merely by evidence that a nonparent would be a superior
custodian, the parent's natural right to custody could be rendered illusory and wjth it
the child's natural right to be reared, where
possible, by his or her natural parent.
[7,8] Consistent with its rationale, the
parental presumption can be rebutted only
by evidence establishing that a particular
parent at a particular time generally lacks
all three of the characteristics that give rise
to the presumption: that no strong mutual
bond exists, that the parent has not demonstrated a willingness to sacrifice his or her
own interest and welfare for the child's,
and that the parent lacks the sympathy for
and understanding of the child that is characteristic of parents generally. The presumption does not apply to a parent who
would be subject to the termination of all
parental rights due to unfitness, abandonment, or substantial neglect, since 3uch a
parent is a fortiori not entitled to custody.
[9] If the presumption in favor of the
natural parent is rebutted, the contestants
for custody compete on equal footing, and
the custody award should be determined
3. Henderson v. Henderson. Utah, 576 P.2d 1289
(1978).
4> Jorjensen v. Jorgensen, Utah, 599 P.24 510
(1979) (Crockett, C J., concurring); Wilton v.
Cotfmmn. 110 Utah 1, 169 P2d 97 (1946).
& Walton v. Coffmmn, note 4, supra.
C Nlehen r. Nielsen, Utah. 620 P2d 511, 512
(1980); In re Cooper, 17 Utah 2d 296, 410 P 2d
475 (1966); Application of Coade, 10 Utah 2d
25,147 P2d 359 (1959).
7.

solely by reference to the best interests of
the child.
[10] Some factors the court may consider in determining the child's best interests relate primarily to the child's feelings
or special needs: the preference of the
child;' keeping siblings together; 4 the relative strength of the child's bond with one
or both of the prospective custodians; * and,
in appropriate cases, the general interest in
continuing previously determined custody
arrangements where the child is happy and
well adjusted.1 Other factors relate primarily to the prospective custodians' character or status or to their capacity or willingness to function as parents: moral character and emotional stability;7 duration
and depth of desire for custody;• ability to
provide personal rather than surrogate
care; f significant impairment of ability to
function as a parent through drug abuse,
excessive drinking, or other cause; lt reasons for having relinquished custody in the
past; ll religious compatibility with the
child; l2 kinship,13 including, in extraordinary circumstances, stepparent status; w and
financial condition.l$ (These factors are not
necessarily listed in order of importance.)
[11] Assessments of the applicability
and relative weight of the various factors in
a particular case lie within the discretion of
the trial court. "Only where trial court
action is so flagrantly unjust as to constitute an abuse of discretion should the appellate forum interpose ita own judgment."
ft. Lembach v. Cox. Utah, 639 P.2d 197 (1961).
16. Kiilas V. Kallax note 7, supra; Walton v.
Coffman, note 4, suprm.
11. Application of Conde. note 6, supra; Saidwin v. NIeiaon. 110 Utah 172. 170 P2d 179
(1946).
12. See U.C.A.. 1953, § 7S-3a-39<12).
13. In re Cooper, note 6, suprm.

Kallma V. KMIIM* UUh, 614 P.2d 641 (1980);

Knjpp v . Knapp, 73 Utah 268. 273 P. 512
(1928); Jorgensen v. Jorgensen.- note 4. suprm.
*• Sute m rr R
I
17 Utah 2d
^49, 411 P2d 839 (1966); Wilton v. Coffmatu
note 4. supra.

14. Cnbble v. Cribble. Utah, 563 P 2d 64 (1978).
15. Walton v. Coffman* note 4, suprm.
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Jorgeruen v. Jorgensen, Utah, 599 P.2d 510,
512 (1979).
[12] The trial court must enter specific
findings on the factors relied upon in
awarding custody. In Chandler v. West,
Utah, 610 P.2d 1299, 1301 (1980), we set
aside an order that refused to modify a
property settlement provision in a divorce
decree but did not enter written findings.
In remanding, we stated: u For this Court
to be in a position to review the propriety
of the trial court's order, it is necessary that
proper findings of fact and conclusions of
law be made pursuant to Rule 52(a), Utah
Rules of Civil Procedure." In Stoddard v.
Stoddard, Utah, 642 ?2A 743 (1982), we
required written findings to accompany an
order modifying a child support provision in
a divorce decree. This requirement of written findings applies with even greater force
to orders awarding or modifying the custody of a child.
[13] In this case, the district court addressed the question of the best interests of
the child without first determining whether
the presumption in favor of the natural
parent had been rebutted. On the present
record—especially in the absence of findings of fact—we are unable to determine
whether, under the standard discussed in
this opinion, Rosemary is entitled to the
benefit of the parental presumption. We
therefore vacate the court's order and remand for further proceedings (including the
taking of additional evidence, if necessary)
consistent with this opinion. No costs
awarded.
HALL, C. J., and STEWART, HOWE and
DURHAM, JJ„ concur.

O |tniU«tClSYlTttt>

Harry J. CHRISTIANSEN, Plaintiff
and Appellant;
v.
UTAH TRANSIT AUTHORITY and John
G. Miller, Defendants and
Respondents.
No- 17250.
Supreme Court of Utah.
June 15, 1982.
Action was filed arising from traffic
accident Upon jury finding that plaintiff
was 70 percent negligent and the defendants 30 percent negligent, the Third District
Court, Salt Lake County, G. Hal Taylor, J.,
entered judgment of "no cause of action** in
favor of the defendants, and the plaintiff
appealed. The Supreme Court, Howe, J.,
held that: (1) trial court did not err in
refusing to give plaintiff a default judgment against one defendant when that defendant failed to appear at trial; (2) giving
of sudden peril instruction was proper; and
(3) trial court did not abuse its discretion in
refusing to amend complaint to allow plaintiff to plead willful and wanton negligence
on part of one defendant and to seek punitive damages.
Affirmed.
L Appeal and Error «*» 1001(1)
Jury finding in suit arising from traffic
accident that plaintiff was 70 percent negligent and defendants were 30 percent negligent, thereby precluding recovery of damages by the plaintiff, was supported by
competent evidence, and thus jury verdict
would not be disturbed by the Supreme
Court ConstArt 3, § 9.
1 Negligence *»142
Jury verdict in suit arising from traffic
accident that plaintiff was 70 percent negligent and defendants were 30 percent negligent, thereby precluding recovery of damages by the plaintiff, was not the result of
sympathy, bias, passion and prejudice.

APPENDIX B

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
KARLA KISHPAUGH,

:

Plaintiff,

:
MEMORANDUM DECISION

vs.

:
CIVIL NO. D 80-1577

RICHARD BRUCE KISHPAUGH,

:

Defendant.
This

case

:

presents

one

this court has had to make.
nor

is

the

law

that

of

the

most

difficult decisions

Not that the facts are that difficult

complicated,

but

the

emotional concern

for the subject of this case presents the gravest of concern.

The
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and

defendant
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was

awarded

Kishpaugh
with
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since

Brian
the
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custody

of

on

June 25, 1981.
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Brian was a handicapped child being afflicted

cerebral palsy.
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make it impossible for her to assume

the custodial role.
This

court

had

chambers.

Brian

is

and

is

was

present

Brian

able

to

the
mute

of

but

mastered

communicate

and

has
by

this

interviewing

Brian

in

the sign language

means.

An

interpreter

assisted the court in communicating with Brian.

expressed
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grandparents.
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and
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me
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exists
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interview

I

he
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that he preferred to live

(his
between
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grandparents).
Brian

and

Brian

where he

Obviously,

a deep

his grandparents.

He

also has a love for his father.
The
of

Brian

real issue in this case is what is for the best interest
(see
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court

concludes

Cooper
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v. DeLand,
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that
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it
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After
for

the

P2d

much
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consideration,
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this

of Brian
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that
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Brian
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for
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Mrs. William

Kornmayer

the

time.

present

Brian

and

the

be

granted

custody

Defendant is to have liberal

court

urges

even greater bond between himself and Brian.

Dated this

the

day of November, 1984.

DEAN E . CONDER
D I S T R I C T JUDGE

him

to create an

APPENDIX C

JANE ALLEN (Bar #45)
Attorney for Plaintiff
261 East 300 South, Suite 150
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 355-1300
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FORa
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
KARLA KISHPAUGH (KORNMAYER),
AMENDED
FINDINGS OF FACT AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
(Judge Dean E* Conder)

Plaintiff,
vs.

Civil No. D80-1577

RICHARD BRUCE KISHPAUGH,
Defendant.

This matter came on for trial the 22nd day of November,
1984, before the Honorable Dean E. Conder.

The natural mother,

above-named Plaintiff, was present, along with her parents, Mr.
and

Mrs.

William

Kornmayer,

who

are

the

Petitioners

for

guardianship of the minor child, in Case No. P84-1Q46 which has
been joined with this action, as was their counsel, Jane Allen,
Esq.

The Defendant was present with his attorney, Michael Z.

Hayes, Esq.
William

Kornmayer,

Karla Kornmayer,

Ona

Landrum,

Richard Kishpaugh, and Mr. and Mrs. Dean Kishpaugh were called as
witnesses.

Mrs. Kornmayer's testimony was accepted by proffer,

as was part of Mrs. Kishpaugh's testimony.

The minor child,

Brian Kishpaugh, was interviewed by the Court in chambers along
with an interpreter for the minor child who is hearing impaired.

1

After hearing testimony of the witnesses and arguments
of counsel at the trial in this matter, and after a hearing
regarding Defendant's Objections to Proposed Findings of Fact and
Conclusions of Law was held on the 18th day of December, 1984 at
which counsel for both parties was present, with the Court's
changes in the Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law
included herein, the Court now makes the following:
FINDINGS OF FACT
1.

The minor child was born February 18, 1976 and is

handicapped with cerebral palsy and a hearing impairment.
2.

The minor child has resided with Petitioners, Mr.

and Mrs. Kornmayer, and his maternal great-grandmother, Ona
Landrum

since June of 1981, which was when the Plaintiff and

Defendant were divorced.
3.

The minor child and the Defendant have a good

relationship one with another which has been enhanced by the
Defendant taking the child for visits during the Thanksgiving and
Easter recesses, together with several other weekend visits
during the year and extended summer visitation, which included
six weeks in 1984 and approximately three weeks during the summer
of 1983.
4.

The child support payments made by Defendant to

Plaintiff were not forwarded by Plaintiff to either her
grandmother or her parents.
5.

The child's behavior and ability to communicate

have improved greatly since he went to live with Petitioners.
2

6.

Petitioners and the child's great-grandmother have

hired tutors and arranged for the child to attend summer school
and camp.
7.

The child's maternal great-grandmother has been

involved with Brian's care and rearage since June of 1981.
8*

The

child

has been

reared

by his

maternal

grandparents and great-grandmother, and they have provided a fit
and proper home for the child.
9.

The minor child wishes to live with Petitioners,

Mr. and Mrs. Kornmayer.
10.

A deep bond of love exists between the mirror child

and his grandparents.
11.

There is love between the Defendant and his son.

12.

There is a stronger bond between the minor child

and the Petitioners than with the defendant.
13.

The Petitioners have done a fantastic

job of

caring for this child.
14. The Defendant nas had a good relationship witn tne
minor

child

and

has

taken

the

child

for

visits

during

Thanksgiving and a week or two in the summer of each year.
15.

Defendant has failed to make all of his support

payments for Brian's care and has paid a total of approximately
$9,837.00 to the

Plaintiff

for child

support

and

alimony,

$6,430.00 of which should be allocated to child support.
16. The Plaintiff has health problems which make it

impossible for her to assume a custodial role at this time*
17.

Defendant has failed to sacrifice his own interest

and welfare for the child's interest and welfare.
18.

Defendant lacks the sympathy for and understanding

of the child that is charactisteric of parents generally.
Having made the foregoing Findings of Fact, the Court
now makes the following:
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1.

Petitioners have overcome the presumption in favor

of the natural parent.
2.

It is in the best interests of the minor child that

Petitioners be granted custody of the minor child at the present
time.
3.

Defendant is granted liberal visitation with the

minor child.
DATED this

day of Xle^^c^Jj*.^

> 1984.

BY THE COURT:

a%2>—-

ON. DEAN E. CONtraRDISTRICT COURT JUDGE

4

MAILING CERTIFICATE
This is to certify that I mailed a true and correct
copy of the foregoing AMENDED FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF
LAW, this

Q^^

day of ^p^f/ltr^-*—

_

1984, to Michael Z.

Hayes, Esq., at LARSEN, MAZURAN & VERHAAREN, 100 Boston Building,
9 Exchange Place, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111.

+-OQ^^

JA-IO/KORN/FIN
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